The Israel Defense Forces on Friday released a preliminary investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the destruction of a World Community Kitchen convoy and the deaths of seven aid workers. The IDF cashiered two officers and reprimanded several more, but even this will not be enough to tamp down the international outrage.
As always, in cases like this, the best way to understand events is visually. This is a map prepared by IDF investigators.
The WCK volunteers left an IDF jetty at 2200 on April 1. The staff were in three passenger vehicles, traveling with an unidentified number of trucks loaded with food. This is Implementation (the white dot) Point 1 on the map.
The departure time and route had been coordinated between WCK and the IDF, but it is unclear if that coordination filtered down to the people making the kill/no-kill decision.
It said a commander “mistakenly” assumed that Hamas gunmen were in the convoy’s vehicles and that Israeli forces also failed to identify the vehicles as belonging to the WCK. In a separate briefing for reporters Thursday, the IDF said the biggest mistake was that the operators of the unmanned aerial vehicle tracking the convoy were not made aware of the aid convoy’s coordination plan.
Things begin to go pear-shaped at Implementation Point 2. That point marks what is essentially the line of contact between the IDF and Hamas. At this point, at least one armed man climbed onto the aid trucks.
Let’s stop here for a moment. There appears to be an agreement between the IDF and Hamas that Hamas fighters can ride shotgun on aid trucks to safeguard the supplies. If you recall, when Biden announced the construction of a temporary port in Gaza, I pointed out that issue.
The most significant risk is obviously security. By creating a large, lucrative target manned by Americans, we are begging for an attack. This temporary port will probably be constructed in the “Humanitarian Safe Zone,” which is under Hamas control. The promise of “no boots on the ground” means that Hamas will perform the shoreside security. If security is not by Hamas and instead performed by one of General Ryder’s mysterious “ally and partner nations,” they will only survive if they become an adjunct to Hamas. No matter the arrangement, it means Hamas fighters will get first choice on all supplies. I’m trying to imagine the political upside of collaborating with a terrorist force, but I’ve got nothing.
Seth Frantzman makes this observation on “X” or whatever the hell Elon Musk is calling it this week.
POINT 1: So here it’s worth flagging how grotesque it is that the whole aid process in Gaza always involves gunmen jumping onto trucks…apparently Hamas gunmen. It shows how the whole problem with the Gaza war in general…which is that because Israel refuses to control areas in Gaza…Israel continues to basically outsource control to others…and the “others” end up being Hamas usually. This creates a ridiculous cycle where Israel is fighting a six month war “against Hamas” but Hamas seems to always seemlessly control most of Gaza today (like 80%?) and has gunmen who systematically take control of aid convoys.
So the PRESENCE of gunmen on aid trucks is a systematic problem. It has not been addressed. And it seems there is a kind of “wink wink” between aid organizations, Hamas and the IDF about this “process”…but it is also a process that can easily turn deadly because of the war.
The Hamas gunman fired shots into the air as he climbed into one of the aid trucks.
The drone unit said it saw a Hamas terrorist climb onto one of the trucks and fire in the air at what it called action point two.According to the IDF, this tactic is frequent and is used by Hamas to send signals to other Hamas fighters in the area regarding his position.
According to the report, the cars with the aid trucks had distinctive markings on the roof, but the drone operators could not see those. Further confusing the matter was the vehicles were Toyota pickups, which the IDF said were associated with Hamas and rarely used by aid organizations. Without visible WCK markings and unaware of the coordination for the WCK convoy to move, the drone operator went straight to the assumption that Hamas had taken over the aid convoy. That working assumption governed all subsequent actions.
As the convoy proceeded, other vehicles joined and left the convoy, making an accurate assessment more difficult. However, through all of this, the working assumption was that the food aid convoy had been hijacked. The drone operator refrained from attacking the convoy during this time.
In the first four action points, the IDF drone unit refrained from attacking the aid trucks because they questioned their commanders and were ordered by Division 162 Brig. Gen. Itzik Cohen not to, despite a suspicion of Hamas terrorists being involved.
At Implementation Point 3, the three vehicles containing WCK staff split off from the convoy. Some of the aid trucks go into a warehouse, further confusing the situation. The WCK vehicles and aid trucks continue to Implementation Point 4. From there, the WCK vehicles head to the coast road.
As the errors were cascading, the IDF tried to contact the WCK vehicles and WCK watch officers.
As the events developed, the IDF tried to call the aid workers involved in the field and was unable to reach them.Next, the IDF called the WCK headquarters. The WCK headquarters tried to call its own aid workers in the field, but they did not answer.
When vehicles left the hangar, the IDF drone unit believed that these were not the same vehicles and thought that these were Hamas vehicles.
Having been shut down while running a range at Grafenwoehr for missing a communications check, I can tell you how vital it is that if you are in a hostile area and have a radio, you listen to it. At least one of the WCK staffers was a military veteran. Either it was a major breach of basic safety protocol or, more likely, given their experience, something happened to their communications gear.
Having designated the three vehicles as Hamas, the kill chain went to work. The first aid vehicle is hit three minutes after leaving the warehouse (Implementation Point 5).
The aid workers bail out of the stricken vehicle and pack into the other two. Two minutes later, the next vehicle was hit. The scene repeated itself. Surviving passengers move to the remaining vehicle. Two minutes after the second vehicle was hit, the third vehicle was also smoked. All seven aid workers were killed.
The IDF identified three critical errors. The official coordination between WCK and the IDF never made it down to the shooters. The convoy was labeled as being under Hamas control based on seeing one Hamas fighter despite, and here I’m adding my two cents, it being known that Hamas “police” guarded the aid trucks. Finally, the shooting continued until all three vehicles were destroyed.
Further, the IDF said that only an attack on the first truck could be somewhat more justified because only there had the drones positively identified Hamas terrorists, whereas the suspicions about Hamas terrorists in the second and third trucks were based more on conjecture regarding the character of the trucks themselves.
The IDF also took action against several officers. Two officers were dismissed from the service: the brigade fire support commander (a major) and the brigade chief of staff (a reserve colonel). The brigade commander and the commander of the 162nd Division commander received reprimands. The IDF Chief of Staff also formally reprimanded the commander of the Southern Command, a general, for his overall responsibility in the incident.
No one thinks this is the end of the affair. The WCK is demanding an “independent” commission, and I can’t imagine the usual suspects in Washington won’t be hopping on that train.
